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Abstract. We compare the effect of different noise scenarios on the achievable rate
of an ε-secure key for the BB84 and the six-state protocol. We study the situation
where quantum noise is added deliberately, and investigate the remarkable benefit
for the finite key rate. We compare our results to the known case of added classical
noise and the asymptotic key rate, i.e. in the limit of infinitely many signals. As a
complementary interpretation we show that under the realistic assumption that the
noise which is unavoidably introduced by a real channel is not fully dedicated to the
eavesdropper, the secret key rate increases significantly.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) aims at establishing a secret key between two parties
Alice and Bob, who are connected via a quantum channel and an authenticated classical
channel. In the last few years, in addition to the studies of asymptotic QKD (i.e. the
unrealistic case of infinitely many signals, which is more accessible theoretically), more
realistic QKD scenarios have been analyzed, where the number of signals sent through
the channel is finite [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
A general aim in studies of security in QKD is to determine a scenario in which
the secure key rate is as high as possible. It has been shown that pre-processing
methods [1, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], like for example adding classical noise [1] or
advantage distillation [1] can increase the secure key rate significantly. Note that those
investigations have focused on pre-processing operating on the classical level. By the
addition of quantum noise a beneficial effect in asymptotic QKD (on the level of mutual
information) has been shown in [20] for the six-state protocol [21, 22]. However, for a
finite number of signals the mutual information of Alice and Bob versus the one of the
eavesdropper Eve is not a direct indicator for the secret key rate.
The purpose of this article is to investigate the effect of quantum noise on secret
key rates with finite resources for the BB84 [23] and six-state protocol [21, 22]. We will
analyse our results for two complementary interpretations: First, we present different
quantum noise scenarios, where the noise is added on purpose, and investigate its benefit
for the secret key rate. Second, we interpret the added noise as the unavoidable noise
introduced by a real channel. We then show how the secret key rate can be improved
if we consider the noise introduced by the channel as not fully due to the interaction of
an eavesdropper. We compare the results to the known effect of classical noise and the
case of infinitely many signals. For the investigation we consider the BB84 and six-state
protocol in the entanglement-based scheme under the assumption of collective attacks.
We use the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [1, 24] to bound the smooth min-
entropy [1] in the high-dimensional Hilbert space, such that the ε-secure key rate can
be mainly determined by the conditional von Neumann entropy of a single-signal-state.
Note that here, for key rates in the finite regime, the assumption of collective attacks
is necessary, since the equivalence of collective and coherent attacks for the BB84 and
the six-state protocol has so far been proven only in the limit of infinitely many signals
[25, 26].
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the general framework
and fix the notation. The different noise scenarios are presented and discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 deals with the calculation and optimization of ε-secure key rates
for these different noise scenarios. The results are given in Section 5, followed by a
conclusion in Section 6.
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2. Preliminaries
In the following we consider the BB84 and six-state protocol in the entanglement-based
scheme, where the eavesdropper Eve can only interact with the signals (labeled by B)
which are sent through the quantum channel. The most general unitary interaction UBE
that Eve can perform is given by [27]
UBE |0〉B |X〉E =
√
1−D |0〉B |A〉E +
√
D |1〉B |B〉E (2.1)
UBE |1〉B |X〉E =
√
1−D |1〉B |C〉E +
√
D |0〉B |D〉E , (2.2)
where |X〉E is Eve’s initial state and |A〉E , |B〉E , |C〉E, |D〉E refer to her 4-dimensional
states after the transformation. The parameter D ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
corresponds to the
disturbance, i.e. the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve if the quantum
channel is otherwise noiseless.
Throughout our paper we will study quantum noise which is given by a depolarizing
channel. (Note that our calculations could in principle be generalized to other models
for quantum noise, but the lower the symmetry of the channel, the more involved the
calculations will be.) The action of the depolarizing channel is described by the map
N p (ρ), where p is the noise parameter.
Definition 1. The action of a depolarizing channel N p (ρ) is given by
N p (ρ) :=
4∑
i=1
AiρA
†
i (2.3)
with the Kraus operators A1 =
√
1− 3
4
p1 , A2 =
√
p
4
σx, A3 =
√
p
4
σy, andA4 =
√
p
4
σz.
Here, σi are the Pauli-operators for i ∈ {x, y, z}.
Analogously, we define classical noise [1] via the map N cl,p (ρ).
Definition 2. The action of a classical noisy channel is given by
N cl,p (ρ) :=
2∑
i=1
BiρB
†
i (2.4)
with B1 =
√
1− p
2
1 and B2 =
√
p
2
σx.
Note that this definition is different from the usual definition of classical noise in
the literature: throughout our paper the probability to flip a bit is called p
2
instead of
p. This choice of p allows a fair comparison of the two different noise models (quantum
versus classical) for the same parameter p, ranging from 0 to 1.
Our central figure of merit is the ε-secure key rate for a finite number of signals.
We will use this quantity in the following to compare different noise scenarios. The ε-
secure key rate is calculated for a typical protocol that consists of the procedures state
distribution, measurement, sifting, parameter estimation (PE), one-way error correction
(EC) and privacy amplification (PA). Let εPE, εEC and εPA be the probability of failure
for the protocol steps parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification,
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respectively. Then with a smoothing parameter ε¯ we can bound the total security of
the protocol by
ε := ε¯+ εPE + εEC + εPA. (2.5)
For such a protocol it has been shown in [1, 6] that the rate of an ε-secure key is given
by
r =
1
N
min
ρAB∈Γζ
(H ε¯min (ρ
n
XE |E)− nfECH(X|Y )) +
2
N
log (2εPA) , (2.6)
where the smooth min-entropy [1]
Hεmin (ρAE |E) := sup
σAE∈B
ε
2 (ρAE)
sup
ρE∈S(H)
Hmin (σAE|ρE) (2.7)
is defined as an optimization of the min-entropy
Hmin (σAE |ρE) := sup
{
λ ∈ ℜ : 2−λ1 A ⊗ ρE − σAE ≥ 0
}
(2.8)
over an ε-environment given by
Bε (ρ) :=
{
σ :
1
2
||σ − ρ||1 ≤ ε
}
, (2.9)
with the 1-norm ||A||1 = tr
(√
AA†
)
. Here, S(H) denotes the set of density operators
on the Hilbert space H. The smooth min-entropy of the classical-quantum state
ρnXE shared by Alice and Eve and the correction 2 log2 (2εPA) are due to privacy
amplification. It quantifies Eve’s uncertainty of Alice’s and Bob’s perfectly correlated
bitstring. The term fECH(X|Y ) stands for the number of bits which Alice and Bob leak
to the eavesdropper due to public communication during the error correction procedure.
H(X|Y ) denotes the conditional Shannon entropy H(X|Y ) = H(ρXY ) − H(ρY ) with
H(X) = −∑x p(x) log (p(x)). For simplicity we consider an ideal error correction
protocol, i.e. fEC = 1. The minimization of the smooth min-entropy is due to parameter
estimation, where we only except qubit-states ρAB which are contained in the set [5, 10]
Γζ :=
{
ρ :
1
2
||λm(ρ)− λ∞(ρ)||1 ≤ ζ(εPE, 2, m)
}
(2.10)
with
ζ(εPE, np, m) :=
√√√√ ln ( 1εPE
)
+ np ln (m+ 1)
8m
, (2.11)
where λm(ρ) (λ∞(ρ)) denotes the measurement statistics due to an m (m → ∞)-fold
independent application of a measurement.
Under the assumption of collective attacks, i.e. ρnXE = ρ
⊗n
XE we can use the AEP
[1, 24]
Hεmin
(
ρ⊗nXE |E
)
≥ n

S(X|E)− 5
√
log (2/ε)
n

 (2.12)
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to bound the smooth min-entropy for product states ρ⊗nXE by the conditional von
Neumann entropy of a single copy ρXE which is defined as S(X|E) = S(ρXE)− S(ρE)
with S(ρ) = − tr (ρ log ρ). Finally, this leads to
r :=
n
N
min
ρAB∈Γζ

S(X|E)− 5
√
log(2/ε¯)
n
−H(X|Y )

+ 2
N
log (2εPA) .(2.13)
3. Noise scenarios
In this section we present four different noise scenarios which we will investigate in
the following. Initially, if no noise is present, Alice holds one part of the Bell-state
|Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|, with∣∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) , (3.1)
and sends the second part to Bob, while the eavesdropper can perform a unitary
interaction UBE characterized by a disturbance D (see Equation (2.1)) on it. Let us
denote the map that corresponds to the unitary interaction UBE as EBE . The total state
after the action of EBE is then given by
ρ
(0)
ABE = (1 A ⊗ EBE)
(∣∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣∣
AB
⊗ |X〉 〈X|E
)
, (3.2)
where |X〉 〈X|E denotes Eve’s initial state.
Now, four different noise scenarios are considered:
(1) Alice adds depolarizing quantum noise with noise parameter pa to her part of the
Bell-state and sends the other part to Bob (see Figure 1). This leads to the state
ρ
(1)
ABE = (1 A ⊗ EBE)(N paA ⊗ 1BE)
(∣∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣∣
AB
⊗ |X〉 〈X|E
)
. (3.3)
Note that there is obviously no difference between adding Alice’s noise before or
after Eve’s interaction, since they act on different Hilbert spaces.
(2) Alice adds depolarizing noise with noise parameter pb to Bob’s part of the Bell-state
and sends it to Bob (see Figure 2). This leads to the state
ρ
(2)
ABE = (1 A ⊗ EBE)(1A ⊗N pbB ⊗ 1 E)
(∣∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣∣
AB
⊗ |X〉 〈X|E
)
. (3.4)
(3) Bob adds depolarizing noise with noise parameter pnb to his part of the Bell-state
after Eve’s interaction (see Figure 3). This leads to the state
ρ
(3)
ABE = (1 A ⊗N pnbB ⊗ 1E)(1A ⊗ EBE)
(∣∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣∣
AB
⊗ |X〉 〈X|E
)
. (3.5)
(4) Alice introduces classical noise with noise parameter pcl to her classical bit string
after her measurement (see Figure 4).
How do these four scenarios compare, when evaluating the ε-secure key rate?
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Figure 1. Noise scenario 1; Alice adds depolarizing quantum noise to her part of the
initial state.
B
pb
D
E
A
Figure 2. Noise scenario 2; Alice adds depolarizing quantum noise to Bob’s part of
the initial state.
B
p
nb
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A
Figure 3. Noise scenario 3; Bob adds depolarizing quantum noise to his part of the
state after receiving it.
0
0
1
1
1
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Figure 4. Noise scenario 4; Alice adds classical noise to her classical bit string.
4. Secret key rate
The aim of this section is to investigate the effect of the various noise scenarios explained
in the previous section on the finite ε-secure key rate r in Equation (2.13).
From the fact that Alice and Bob share in the beginning a maximally entangled
state (see Equation (3.1)) we know that the action of a depolarizing channel on Alice’s
part or on Bob’s part results in the same total state. This implies that the states ρ
(1)
ABE
and ρ
(2)
ABE are identical for pa = pb and the noise scenarios 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Additionally, we now show the equivalence of noise scenario 1 and 4, i.e. adding
rotationally invariant quantum noise is equivalent to adding classical noise. Let us
assume for noise scenario 4 that we add classical noise with probability pcl
2
to flip a
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bit (see Definition 2) to a bit-string resulting from measurements in the z-basis. In
noise scenario 1 only the Pauli-operators σx and σy from the depolarizing channel (see
Definition 1) lead to a bit-flip, such that the total probability to flip a bit is given by
pa
4
+ pa
4
= pa
2
. Note that for the cases in scenario 4 that the bit-strings were obtained
by measurements in x (y)-basis the same argument holds. Then only σy and σz (σx and
σz) lead to bit-flips in scenario 1, and due to the symmetry of the depolarizing channel
the probability to flip is also pa
2
in both cases. This implies the equivalence of scenario
1 and scenario 4 for pa = pcl.
Noise scenario 3 will not lead to any benefit for the key rate as it only increases
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). This asymmetry between noise scenario 2 and 3 is
due to the underlying one-way error-correction protocol, such that adding Bob’s noise
after Eve’s interaction only influences the key rate r by increasing H(X|Y ).
The equivalence of the noise scenarios 1, 2 and 4, together with the fact that scenario
3 can only be detrimental for the secret key rate, enable us to focus for the rest of this
paper on a specific noise scenario, namely noise scenario 1. We start for simplicity with
the investigation of the asymptotic key rate (i.e. Equation (2.13) for N → ∞, ε → 0)
given by [28]
rasym = S(X|E)−H(X|Y ). (4.1)
Later, the effect of noise on the finite key rate (see Equation (2.13)) follows by including
the finite-size effects.
In order to determine Eve’s unknown probes in the state ρ
(1)
ABE , given in Eq. (3.3),
namely |A〉E , |B〉E , |C〉E , |D〉E , we expand each probe in basis vectors
|A〉E = αa |00〉+ βa |01〉+ γa |10〉+ δa |11〉 (4.2)
with the normalization condition
|αa|2 + |βa|2 + |γa|2 + |δa|2 = 1 (4.3)
and a similar parametrization for |B〉E , |C〉E , |D〉E, with indices b, c, d, respectively. A
partial-trace operation on ρ
(1)
ABE over Eve’s part leads to the state ρ
(1)
AB, which corresponds
to the state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve’s unitary interaction. It has been shown
in [25, 26] that the BB84 and the six-state protocol permit to characterize the state ρ
(1)
AB
as Bell-diagonal, parametrized by the quantum bit error rate Q.
ρ
(1)
AB = λ1
∣∣∣Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+∣∣∣+ λ2 ∣∣∣Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−∣∣∣+ λ3 ∣∣∣Φ+〉 〈Φ+∣∣∣+ λ4 ∣∣∣Φ−〉 〈Φ−∣∣∣ , (4.4)
with the Bell-states∣∣∣Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) (4.5)
∣∣∣Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) , (4.6)
and the parameters
λ1 = 1− 3
2
Q, λ2 = λ3 = λ4 =
Q
2
(4.7)
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for the six-state protocol, while
λ1 = 1− 2Q+ λ4, λ2 = λ3 = Q− λ4, λ4 ∈ [0, Q] (4.8)
for the BB84 protocol. Note that the symmetry properties of ρ
(1)
AB are preserved by
adding symmetric depolarizing noise (see Definition 1).
We can express the QBER Q as a function of the noise parameter pa, which is
introduced by the depolarizing channel, and Eve’s disturbance D:
Q = (1− pa)D + pa
2
. (4.9)
For the six-state protocol we obtain the following additional conditions on Eve’s probes:
〈A|B〉E = 〈A|D〉E = 〈B|C〉E = 〈D|C〉E = 〈B|D〉E = 0 (4.10)
and
〈A|C〉E =
1− 2Q
(1− pa)(1−D) . (4.11)
W.l.o.g. we can choose |D〉E = |00〉 and |B〉E = |11〉. It follows that
|A〉E = βa |01〉+
√
1− |βa|2 |10〉 , (4.12)
|C〉E = βc |01〉+
√
1− |βc|2 |10〉 . (4.13)
By using Equation (4.11) we eliminate βa, such that with the constraints in Equation
(4.10) the state ρ
(1)
ABE contains only one unknown parameter, namely βc.
Analogously, we get for the BB84 protocol the following constraints:
〈A|B〉E = 〈A|D〉E = 〈B|C〉E = 〈D|C〉E = 0 (4.14)
and
〈B|D〉E =
Q− 2λ4
(1− pa)D, (4.15)
〈A|C〉E =
1− 3Q+ 2λ4
(1− pa)(1−D) . (4.16)
W.l.o.g. we can choose |A〉E = |11〉 and |B〉E = |00〉. It follows that
|C〉E =
√
1− |δc|2 |10〉+ δc |11〉 , (4.17)
|D〉E = αd |01〉+
√
1− |αd|2 |10〉 . (4.18)
By using Equation (4.15) and Equation (4.16) we can reduce the unknown parameters
of the state ρ
(1)
ABE to the single parameter λ4.
Remember that ρ
(1)
ABE describes the quantum state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve
after the state distribution step for noise scenario 1. Let us denote the classical-classical-
quantum state that results from local von Neumann measurements performed by Alice
and Bob by ρXY E. The states ρXE and ρXY , which are needed for the calculation of
the asymptotic key rate in Equation (4.1), follow directly by a partial-trace operation
on Bob’s part and Eve’s part, respectively.
The unknown parameter βc (λ4) for the six-state protocol (BB84 protocol) has to be
chosen in such a way that it minimizes the asymptotic key rate in Equation (4.1), such
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that these states realize Eve’s best strategy. After including the finite-key corrections
(Equation (2.13)) into the optimization, the key rate is now fully determined by the noise
parameter pa and the disturbance D, such that the effects of noise can be calculated,
also in the regime of a finite number of signals.
5. Results
In this section we present our results on the secret key rate in the noisy scenario described
above. We will discuss two possible interpretations of our results: In subsection 5.1 we
consider the case that the noise is introduced deliberately by Alice. In subsection 5.2 we
analyse the case where the noise is given by the channel and did not originate from the
eavesdropper. The finite-key rate r (Equation (2.13)) will be calculated in both cases
for a total security parameter of ε = 10−9. The results are obtained from a numerical
optimization procedure, which maximizes the key rate with respect to the parameters
m, ε¯, εPE, εEC, εPA, while minimizing with respect to the parameters βc (λ4), for the
six-state (BB84) protocol.
5.1. Introducing noise deliberately
In the following we illustrate the effect of deliberately added noise (see Section 3) on
the finite key rate r (see Equation (2.13)).
In Figure 5 the behaviour of N0, the minimal number of signals that is needed to
extract a non-zero key, with respect to the disturbance D is shown for an optimal noise
parameter pa (see Figure 6) for the BB84 and the six-state protocol. In comparison to the
noiseless case we obtain a beneficial effect on the finite key rate by introducing quantum
noise pa: In the six-state (BB84) protocol with D = 0.12 (D = 0.1) the improvement
in the minimal number of signals N0 is of the order of a million signals. Additionally,
we find that noise enables us to extract a non-zero key for higher disturbances than in
the noiseless case: We recover for our case of a finite number of signals the result of
[25], which states that the maximum tolerated error rate introduced by Eve to extract a
non-zero key is shifted from 12.6% to 14.1% (11.0% to 12.4%) for the six-state (BB84)
protocol, in the asymptotic limit N0 →∞.
In Figure 6 we show the optimal noise parameter pa that minimizes N0 and compare
it to the optimal noise parameter pa that maximizes the asymptotic key rate (Equation
(4.1)) for various disturbances D for the BB84 and the six-state protocol. It turns out
that the optimal noise parameter pa for the finite case is always higher than the one for
the asymptotic case. In particular, for the asymptotic key rate the optimal pa becomes
non-zero for around D = 0.096 (D = 0.083) for the six-state (BB84) protocol, while
the benefit for the threshold N0 in the finite scenario appears already for disturbances
around 0.08 (0.06) for the six-state (BB84) protocol.
In Figure 7 we show the optimal secret key rate r as a function of the number
of signals N for a fixed disturbance D = 0.1 for the BB84 protocol and D = 0.12
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Figure 5. Comparison of the optimal minimal number N0 to extract a non-zero key
(ε = 10−9) versus the QBER D introduced by Eve for the BB84 (circles (black)) and
the six-state protocol (squares (red)); straight line: noise scenario 1 (see Section 3),
dashed line: no noise.
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Figure 6. Comparison of the optimal noise parameter that minimizes N0 (straight
lines) for the finite-key rate (Equation (2.13)) and the one that maximizes the
asymptotic key rate (Equation (4.1)) (dashed lines) versus the QBER D introduced by
Eve for noise scenario 1 (see Section 3); circles (black): BB84, squares (red): six-state.
for the six-state protocol, and compare it to the case without added noise. We obtain
that the effect of noise on the finite-key rate is more beneficial than the effect on the
asymptotic key rate, when taking the relative increase of the key rate as figure of merit.
For example, for N = 108 signals we have an increase of 39% (153%) in the key rate,
whereas the benefit for N = 1016 is only about 20% (50%) for the BB84 (six-state)
protocol.
5.2. Noise given by the channel
The equivalence of noise scenario 1 and 2 for pa = pb allows us to interpret the results
obtained in Section 4 in another way. In contrast to adding noise deliberately the number
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Figure 7. Comparison of the finite-key rate (Equation (2.13)) versus signals N for a
fixed disturbance D for the BB84 protocol (D = 0.1) (circles (black)) and the six-state
protocol (D = 0.12) (squares (red)); straight line: noise scenario 1 (see Section 3) for
optimal noise parameter, dashed line: no noise. Lines are drawn to guide the eye.
pb can be interpreted as the amount of noise that is introduced by the used quantum
channel, which is unavoidable in real QKD settings, and not necessarily dedicated to the
eavesdropper. This interpretation describes the situation in real experiments, where the
assumption of unconditional security, i.e. all errors introduced by the channel have to
be attributed to the eavesdropper, is over-pessimistic [29, 7]. If one makes the realistic
assumption that Eve cannot replace the noisy channel by a noisefree one, the channel
noise does not lead to knowledge of Eve about the key, and the key rate will thus
increase. In Figure 8 the finite-key rate (Equation (2.13)) is shown as a function of the
number of signals N sent through the channel for a fixed QBER (Q = 5%) for different
values of the noise parameter pb for the six-state and BB84 protocol. The measured
QBER contains both the noise pb that we attribute to the channel and the noise D
that is related to Eve’s unitary interaction. For the explicit connection between these
different types of noise see Eq. (4.9). Taking this fact into account leads to remarkably
higher key rates, as shown in Figure 8. For example, for N = 108 signals, without added
noise the key rate in the six-state (BB84) protocol is 0.37 (0.34), while for channel noise
of pb = 0.05 it is 0.47 (0.46) for the six-state (BB84) protocol.
6. Conclusions
In this article we have shown that the presence of quantum noise can improve secret
key rates, in particular in the realistic scenario of a finite number of resources. We
have investigated the effect of different noise scenarios on an ε-secure key rate for the
BB84 and the six-state protocol in the entanglement-based scheme, for a finite number
of signals. Our results can be interpreted in two ways: First, when taking the view that
noise is added deliberately, it turns out that the effect of adding depolarizing noise to
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Figure 8. Comparison of the finite-key rates (Equation (2.13)) (ε = 10−9) versus
number of signals N for various noise parameters pb with QBER = 5% for the BB84
(circles (black)) and the six-state protocol (squares (red)); dashed lines: pb = 0,
straight lines: pb = 5%.
the state (before the state transmisson) is equal to the benefit gained by adding classical
noise, i.e. when Alice performs probabilistic bit-flips on her measured bit string. We
obtain that for both the BB84 and the six-state protocol the benefit (concerning the
key rate) of adding noise is higher in the regime of a finite number of signals than
for the asymptotic key rate. Second, under the realistic assumption that a channel
itself introduces noise unavoidably, i.e. the noise is not necessarily created by the
eavesdropper, the secret key rate increases significantly with respect to the ”worst case”,
where all noise is attributed to Eve’s intervention. This improvement comes from the
fact that the errors from the quantum channel do not give Eve information about the
key. This approach avoids the over-pessimistic assumption of unconditional security,
and is thus meaningful for realistic experiments.
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